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INTRODUCTION
After the terrorist attacks against the United States on September
11, 2001, the balance of power between the executive and legislative
1
branches of government in this country shifted. President Bush’s
response to the attacks included substantial steps to expand the
executive’s unilateral authority in the arenas of international affairs
2
and war powers. Both President Bush and President Obama have
extended executive power and then staunchly protected their
expansion of authority from limitation by the legislative and judicial
3
branches. Further, Bush’s use of presidential signing statements to
1. See Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash is Latest Chapter in Bush Effort to Widen
Executive Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A1 (stating that President Bush
“has taken what scholars call a more expansive view of his role than any commander
in chief in decades”); David G. Savage, Administration Stays Course in Legal War, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at A13 (providing an overview of the Bush administration’s
expansion of executive power).
2. See Amanda Frost, Essay, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1941 (2007) (citing the Bush administration’s
extraordinary rendition program and the warrantless wire tapping program as
examples of controversial post-September 11th expansions of executive power).
Another well known example is President Bush’s use of the enemy combatant
designation to avoid legal protections and international rights for certain detainees.
See infra note 53 (discussing the line of cases addressing the rights of Guantanamo
Bay detainees).
3. The application of the state secrets privilege was an early example of the
Obama administration maintaining the expansion of executive power initiated by the
Bush administration during the war on terrorism. Peter Finn, Justice Dept. Uses “State
Secrets” Defense; Obama Backs Bush Decision on Rendition Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
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undermine legislative intent suggests that the executive’s power to
4
avoid legislative input may be virtually limitless.
5
The Supreme Court’s 2008 Medellín v. Texas decision appeared to
be an example of the judiciary reversing that trend by countering an
additional assertion of executive power. In Medellín, the Court
rejected the President’s efforts to force Texas to comply with an
International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision ordering
6
reconsideration of Jose Medellín’s original conviction. However,
while the Court facially limited the executive’s power in that instance,
it also opened a new avenue for the President to exercise his
authority with regard to treaty interpretation.
Since its earliest days, the Court has recognized a distinction
between treaty terms that are automatically binding (“self-executing”)
and those that require additional legislative attention (“non-self7
executing”). However, early rulings were inconsistent and created
8
In Medellín, the Court
confusion in applying this distinction.
attempted to clarify this area of the law by endorsing a strict
9
text-based approach to treaty interpretation.
Relying on that
approach, the majority asserted the novel concept that a treaty term
is not domestically enforceable without further action unless the
language in the treaty clearly indicates that the parties intended the
10
term to be self-executing.
2009, at A4; see also Frost, supra note 2, at 1931–32 (describing how plaintiffs in suits
challenging the use of the state secrets privilege argue that the executive undermines
the judicial branch’s role in determining the legality of state action by using the
privilege).
4. See Phillip J. Cooper, Signing Statements as Declaratory Judgments: The President
as Judge, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 253, 255 (2007) (arguing that signing statements
have developed into a tool to expand executive power, limit legislative authority, and
constrain the judiciary).
5. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
6. See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (discussing the ICJ holding
regarding Medellín and numerous other Mexican citizens in similar circumstances).
7. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (finding that a treaty
term is only domestically binding when the term operates without the need for
additional legislation), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty
Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1272 (2002) (“[B]uilding on the premise of Foster v.
Neilson, the Supreme Court has long distinguished between what have come to be
known as self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.”).
8. See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text (addressing the pre-Medellín
history of judicial interpretation of self-executing treaties).
9. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1358–60 (applying a text-based approach to the
interpretation of the language “undertakes to comply” in the U.N. Charter).
10. See id. at 1359 n.5 (asserting that “the ‘undertakes to comply’ language
confirms that further action to give effect to an ICJ judgment was contemplated”).
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This Comment argues that this approach to treaty interpretation
creates a presumption of non-self-execution and effectively grants the
executive the final say in deciding whether to enforce treaty
obligations within the United States, thereby increasing executive
11
power. This Comment further argues that this increase in executive
power could undermine the constitutional role of legislators in the
12
treaty-making process.
Additionally, this Comment uses a hypothetical scenario to explore
how the imbalance of power created by Medellín may lead to a
situation where senators have standing to sue in their institutional
13
capacity. This is more challenging than it initially appears because
14
legislators have more hurdles to overcome than private parties.
However, if senators can show that the executive’s interpretation of a
treaty is inconsistent with their intent, they could claim that their
votes to ratify the treaty were rendered completely ineffective, thus
15
establishing a claim of vote nullification. Vote nullification, an issue
not often addressed by the Supreme Court, is the only injury that the
16
Court has recognized as sufficient to create legislative standing.
Further, the senators must show that the issue is a legal one instead of
a matter that is better suited for the political branches of the
17
government.
Thus, this Comment discusses the implications of Medellín on treaty
interpretation, separation of powers, and legislative standing. Part I
of this Comment discusses the development of the distinction
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties and the
evolution of legislative standing. Part II presents a scenario raised by
the Medellín holding where the executive could refuse to enforce a
treaty obligation based on his unilateral interpretation that the
relevant treaty terms were non-self-executing. Part III argues that the

11. See infra Part III.
12. See id.
13. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (recognizing legislators’
standing to challenge executive action based on the executive’s undermining of the
effectiveness of the legislators’ votes).
14. See infra Part IV (considering the path to justiciability for legislators and the
need for a concrete injury to create standing).
15. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the unique standing issues faced by legislators).
16. See David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV.
205, 214 (2001) (identifying Coleman as the one instance where the Court recognized
an institutional injury as the basis for a suit by members of Congress).
17. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (setting forth the criteria
necessary to avoid nonjusticiability under the political question doctrine).
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Court created a presumption of non-self-execution in the Medellín
decision and explains how that presumption creates new executive
powers. Part IV argues that if a president’s interpretation is
inconsistent with Congress’s action on the treaty, members of
Congress would have standing to sue in their institutional capacity.
Additionally, this Part provides alternate recommendations to
prevent the President from asserting unchecked power in treaty
interpretation.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Medellín Emphasized the Distinction Between Self-Executing Treaties
and Non-Self-Executing Treaties
In Medellín, the Roberts Court focused on two principle issues.
First, the Court considered whether a judgment by the ICJ was
18
enforceable as domestic law in a state court. Second, the Court
addressed whether a presidential order enforcing the ICJ’s judgment
19
preempted state procedural rules.
In 1993, three hours after his arrest for the rape and murder of two
20
teenagers, Jose Ernesto Medellín confessed to the crimes. Between
his arrest and confession, Texas police officers did not inform
Medellín of his right to notify the Mexican consulate about his
21
detention.
A Texas district court convicted Medellín of capital
22
murder and sentenced him to death for his crimes.
While Medellín was unsuccessfully challenging his conviction in
23
various United States courts, the ICJ considered a claim brought by
Mexico against the United States pursuant to multiple international
24
agreements. The ICJ determined that Medellín and other Mexican
nationals were entitled to the review and reconsideration of their
18. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1354.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying
Medellín’s application for a Certificate of Appealability); Medellín v. Cockrell,
No. Civ.A. H-01-4078, 2003 WL 25321243, at *28 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 2003) (granting
a motion for summary judgment requested by the Director of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division).
24. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 24
(Mar. 31) [hereinafter Avena] (“The present proceedings have been brought by
Mexico against the United States on the basis of the Vienna Convention, and of the
Optional Protocol . . . .”).
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state-court convictions because of the United States’s failure to
25
inform the Mexican consulate of the Mexican nationals’ detention.
Following the ICJ decision, the executive branch ordered state courts
26
to give effect to that decision.
Based on the decision and the
subsequent executive memorandum, Medellín filed a second
27
application for a writ of habeas corpus in a Texas court. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the application, and Medellín
28
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court specifically considered aspects of three treaties in the
Medellín decision to decide whether the ICJ judgment was
enforceable domestically. First, the Court addressed the Vienna
29
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). The VCCR requires
arresting countries to inform the consular of the detainee’s home
30
country of the detention upon the request of the detainee.
The Court then considered the VCCR’s Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional
31
Protocol).
Under the Optional Protocol, the United States
consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ for all claims arising out of
32
the VCCR. Finally, the Court turned to the United Nations Charter,
25. Id. at 71–73.
26. Specifically, in a memorandum to Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez,
President Bush stated that “the United States will discharge its international
obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in [Avena] by
having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles
of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.”
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Medellín v.
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984).
27. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1353.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
78, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
31. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1353.
32. See Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
art. I, Apr. 24, 1964, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (providing that disputes
stemming from the VCCR are within the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and any
party to the dispute and Optional Protocol may bring a claim in the ICJ); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 903 (1987)
(stating that countries may submit a dispute to the ICJ where the countries are
“bound by an agreement providing for the submission to the Court of a category of
disputes that includes the dispute in question”). The United States withdrew from
the jurisdiction of the ICJ over general treaty and international law matters in 1986.
Id. § 907 cmt. c. The United States announced its withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol on March 7, 2005 in light of the ICJ’s holding in Avena, thereby eliminating
ICJ jurisdiction over the United States in future disputes arising from the VCCR.
U.S. Dep’t of State, Announcement: All Consular Notification Requirements
Remain in Effect (2005), available at http:// travel.state.gov/news/news_2155.html#.
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specifically considering a number of articles within that document.
Article 92 of the U.N. Charter establishes the ICJ as the principal
34
legal body within the United Nations. Article 94 states that each
member of the United Nations “undertakes to comply” with any ICJ
35
decision. The Statute of the International Court of Justice grants
jurisdiction to the ICJ where any other treaty provides that the ICJ
36
will be the source of dispute resolution.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that the ICJ judgment was not
enforceable as federal law and that neither the judgment nor
executive action could supersede a Texas law limiting successive
37
petitions for habeas corpus. The Court held that the ICJ decision
did not have automatic legal effect in the United States because the
various treaties did not make the enforcement of an ICJ decision
binding federal law and because Congress had not passed
38
implementing legislation. Specifically, the Court determined that
the “undertakes to comply” language in the U.N. Charter only
committed the member nations to take additional political action to
39
comply with future ICJ decisions.
The Court relied upon the
treaties’ text and the enforcement structure within the Optional
Protocol and ICJ process to find that ICJ decisions were not legally
40
binding.
The Court also ruled that the President cannot

33. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1353–54.
34. U.N. Charter art. 92.
35. Id. art. 94, para. 1.
36. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 1, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 1059, 3 Bevans 1153, 1186.
37. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1353 (specifying the Avena judgment and the
Presidential Memorandum as being subordinate to Texas state law). The Texas law
in question limited subsequent applications for habeas corpus to applications that
asserted claims and issues based on legal or factual bases not available at the time of
the original application and that claimed “no rational juror could have found the
applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” or that claimed “no rational juror
would have answered in the state’s favor one or more of the special issues.”
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 2009) (repealed 2009).
38. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357.
39. See id. at 1358 (agreeing with the President’s amicus brief argument). The
Court went on to say that the language in the U.N. Charter confirmed that
something more was necessary for an ICJ decision to be domestically binding. Id. at
1359 n.5.
40. See id. at 1358–60 (reviewing specific language within the relevant treaties and
determining that the language did not convey an intent that the terms be
self-executing).
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domestically execute a non-self-executing treaty without
41
congressional approval.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, wrote an
extensive dissent, arguing (in part) that the majority should have
relied on the Supremacy Clause and the case law applying that clause
42
to treaties. First, Breyer argued that the text-dependent approach
was flawed because the dispositive language the majority sought is
43
rarely available in treaties. Second, Breyer stated that precedential
case law on the subject required using a context-specific approach,
considering factors such as: the language of the relevant treaties, the
legal and practical implications of a decision in either direction, and
44
any concerns from the political branches regarding the treaty terms.
Justice Breyer applied this approach to the relevant treaty terms in
Medellín and found that this application resulted in the treaty being
45
self-executing and the ICJ decision being domestically enforceable.
On August 5, 2008, the Supreme Court refused to temporarily stay
Medellín’s death sentence, and shortly thereafter Texas officials
46
carried out the execution. Since the Medellín decision, scholars have
debated the implications of the holding in a wide variety of fields
ranging from international obligations to the death penalty in the
47
United States.

41. See id. at 1371 (“[T]he authority of the President to represent the United
States before such bodies speaks to the President’s international responsibilities, not
any unilateral authority to create domestic law.”).
42. See id. at 1389 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority “look[ed] for
the wrong thing . . . using the wrong standard . . . in the wrong place”).
43. See id. at 1381 (“[T]he absence or presence of language in a treaty about a
provision’s self-execution proves nothing at all.”).
44. See id. at 1382–89 (considering seven factors as part of the context-specific
approach to determine whether the relevant treaty terms were self-executing).
45. Id. at 1383.
46. See Manuel Roig-Franzia, Mexican National Executed in Texas, WASH. POST, Aug.
6, 2008, at A6 (chronicling the last-minute stay requests and execution of Jose
Medellín).
47. See generally Opinio Juris, Medellin:
An Insta-Symposium, http://
opiniojuris.org/2008/03/25/medellin-an-insta-symposium/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2010) (discussing the implications of the Medellín holding within a broad array of
legal fields including treaty obligations, the death penalty in the United States,
habeas corpus rights, and the role of the legislature).
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B. Medellín Raises a New Separation of Powers Issue by Questioning
Which Branch of the Government Has the Strongest Role in Treaty
Enforcement
The Roberts Court considered Medellín in the middle of an
ongoing conflict over how much power each branch of the
government should hold, particularly over national security issues.
President Bush sought to extend his power in a variety of ways after
the September 11th attacks, and this debate continues as President
48
Obama has maintained that trend in some respects. The executive,
however, is not the only branch responsible for this shift in power.
Congress plays an important role in determining the strength of the
49
executive. One example of Congress deferring significant power to
the executive was the Authorization for Use of Military Force
50
(AUMF) in 2001.
By authorizing President Bush to use almost
unlimited power to engage in the undefined war on terrorism,
Congress ceded much of its role in the oversight of executive action
51
taken under the auspices of executing that war.
The third party involved in controlling the strength of the
executive is the judicial branch. Disputes between the President and
the courts over the executive’s role after September 11th are well
52
chronicled. At times, the judicial branch, particularly the Supreme
Court, has played an active and important role in limiting the scope
53
of the executive’s power.
However, in other cases, courts have
48. See, e.g., Anne E. Kornblut & Scott Wilson, Obama Reports Gains Made Against
Al Qaeda, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2009, at A12 (recognizing that Obama has been
criticized for continuing Bush’s policies on wiretapping and rendition).
49. See Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
395, 396 (2009) (considering the role of Congress in determining executive power
and arguing that traditionally “presidential power is largely defined by the tug and
pull between Congress and the White House”).
50. See Pub. L. No. 107–40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (allowing the
executive to take military action in response to the September 11th attacks).
51. See Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair the “Broken Branch”?,
89 B.U. L. REV. 765, 771 (2009) (arguing that the Bush administration used the
AUMF to justify a variety of programs, even against the will of Congress).
52. See Savage, supra note 1, at A1 (discussing the legal battle surrounding the
expansion of executive power by the Bush administration).
53. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (establishing that
enemy combatants were entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hearing); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 559–60, 594 (2006) (rejecting the Bush administration’s
claim that the Detainee Treatment Act deprived the Court of jurisdiction over a
foreign national detained in Guantanamo Bay and rejecting the military
commissions established by the Act as unconstitutional); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that due process requires that American citizens

740

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:731

granted the President broad authority to carry out the war on
54
Further, courts have avoided involvement in certain
terrorism.
55
balance of power disputes between the legislature and the executive.
This hesitancy is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence dating
56
back to Marbury v. Madison and is best reflected through the political
question doctrine, as well as other theories regarding a limited
57
judiciary.
Within the broad academic debate over the impact of Medellín is a
discussion about how its holding affects the balance of power in the
United States between the executive and legislative branches. Some
commentators argue that Medellín slowed the trend of power shifting
in favor of the executive by strengthening an important legislative
58
check on treaty enforcement. Other scholars claim that Medellín
reflects the judicial branch’s attempt to retain power against both the
59
legislative and executive branches and other outside influences.

held as enemy combatants be given an opportunity to challenge their detention);
see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo:
The Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (arguing that the Boumediene
holding rejected a significant portion of the Bush administration’s antiterrorist
strategy).
54. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007) (agreeing with
the government’s assertion that the state secrets privilege prevented El-Masri from
bringing a suit against the government claiming that he had been tortured and
illegally detained); Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security
Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1250–51 (2007) (discussing the Bush
administration’s use of the state secrets privilege as a legal tactic to avoid judicial
review of executive actions); see also FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-261, § 802, 122 Stat. 2436, 2468 (2008) (requiring that any court proceeding
addressing an entity’s cooperation with the government’s wiretap program be
dismissed upon the Attorney General’s certification).
55. See infra notes 172–182 and accompanying text (discussing the political
question doctrine).
56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
57. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
63 (2d ed. 2002) (identifying the political question doctrine as a limit on judicial
interference with the other branches of government, particularly in the realm of
foreign policy); see also John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing,
42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220 (1993) (arguing that standing is vital to preserving the
limited role of the courts).
58. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, Upstairs, Downstairs: Subnational Incorporation of
International Human Rights Law at the End of an Era, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 415
(2008) (recognizing the Medellín holding as a limitation on executive power relating
to human rights).
59. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants, 54 WAYNE L.
REV. 1131, 1136 (2008) (arguing that Medellín exemplified Justice Kennedy’s recent
attempts to “uphold the prerogatives of the Supreme Court”).
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Finally, some even argue that Medellín raised more questions than it
60
resolved due to the narrowness of the holding.
C. Medellín is the Latest in an Ongoing—Albeit Small—Series of Decisions
that Address the Treaty-Making Process and the Distinction Between
Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties
While drafting the Constitution, the Founders divided the treatymaking process between the legislative and executive branches.
The Treaty Clause placed the power to make treaties in the hands of
the President, but required the executive to obtain the advice of the
Senate and the consent of at least two-thirds of the Senate’s members
61
present at the time of the vote.
62
Today, the official treaty-making process remains consistent.
However, recently, the executive has relied increasingly on a tool
called an “executive agreement” instead of treaties to finalize
63
negotiations with other nations.
An executive agreement is a
unilateral agreement between the American executive and a foreign
64
executive outside the constitutional treaty-making process.
Empirical evidence published in 2009 indicates that executives tend
to favor executive agreements over treaties when efficiency is the
65
most important concern. Despite the rise of executive agreements,

60. See, e.g., Mary D. Hallerman, Medellin v. Texas: The Treaties that Bind,
43 U. RICH. L. REV. 797, 814–20 (2009) (claiming that Medellín’s impact may lead to
unresolved questions regarding the United States’s international relationships, treaty
language, presidential powers, and the states’ role in international treaty making).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President “shall have Power,
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur”).
62. See Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Law Making in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1278–86 (2008) (explaining that
the reasons for the Treaty Clause’s contents were the views that senators would serve
as presidential advisors and regional interests would be protected, and arguing that
both reasons are presently irrelevant).
63. See GLEN S. KRUTZ & JEFFREY S. PEAKE, TREATY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 51 (2009) (“94 percent of international agreements
completed by American presidents today are executive agreements rather than
treaties.”).
64. See id. at 30 (describing executive agreements as treaties formed without the
advice and consent of the Senate).
65. See id. at 67 (arguing that the use of executive agreements since 1949
indicates a concern for institutional efficiency rather than a desire for political
evasion).
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treaties entered pursuant to Article II of the Constitution still play an
66
important role in modern foreign policy.
The Supremacy Clause suggests that all treaties made under the
Treaty Clause have the same legal weight as the Constitution and the
67
68
laws of Congress.
However, the 1829 Foster v. Neilson Supreme
Court decision introduced the concept that there were two different
types of treaties, some that were domestically binding and some that
69
were not.
Foster was a land dispute case, where Foster and his
partner Elam sought to eject Neilson from land in present-day
70
Louisiana. The Spanish government had sold the land to Jayme
Joydra and, following a number of transactions, Foster and Elam
71
eventually purchased the land from another party. Neilson argued
that Foster and Elam could not own the land because the Spanish
government did not have the authority to convey the land to Joydra
based on treaties that eventually assigned the land to the United
72
States.
In Foster, the Court determined that the two treaties at issue
73
required the United States to recognize the Spanish transaction.
However, the Court held that unless Congress had implemented the
relevant article of the second treaty, the required recognition could
74
not be applied by the courts.
Thus, Foster was the first case to
distinguish between self-executing treaties and non-self-executing

66. See Lisa L. Martin, The President and International Commitments: Treaties as
Signaling Devices, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 440, 460 (2005) (relying on quantitative
models to indicate that treaties are still relevant and often a politically valuable
indication that the executive intends to adhere to the terms of the international
agreement).
67. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing that the “Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land”).
68. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
69. See id. at 314 (holding that a treaty has the same effect as legislation in courts
when it “operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision”).
70. Id. at 255.
71. Id. at 254–55.
72. Id. at 255.
73. Id. at 314–15; see also Carlos M. Vasquez, Foster v. Neilson and United States v.
Percheman: Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 158–
69 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing the Court’s interpretation of the
Treaty of San Ildefonso and the Adams-Onís Treaty).
74. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 (holding that where a treaty requires a party
to engage in a specific act, the requirement is directed at the legislature and is not
judicially enforceable).
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75

treaties.
Specifically, the Foster Court recognized that in some
76
situations, a treaty could operate without implementing legislation.
However, the Court also recognized that in other situations, such as
the one raised in Foster, a treaty could not self-execute; instead, some
77
entity had to effectuate the treaty terms. Beyond this distinction,
the Court offered little clarification on the differences between
78
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.
79
Four years later, in United States v. Percheman, the Court revisited
80
the same treaty terms considered in Foster. In Percheman, the Court
determined that the same treaty clause it had read as non-self81
executing in Foster was in fact self-executing. This reversal was based
on a reading of the Spanish version of the treaty—in Foster, the Court
only considered the English version—and a recognition that the
82
English version of the treaty term was ambiguous.
Percheman
defined a self-executing treaty as one that achieves its goals “by force
83
of the instrument itself.” The Court defined a non-self-executing
84
treaty as one that specifically requires an additional legislative act.
Over the years since those holdings, lower courts have differed in
85
how they defined a self-executing treaty. In Medellín, the Supreme
75. See Carlos M. Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 695, 702 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s statement that only treaties that
operate themselves are applicable without legislative implementation created the
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties).
76. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 (finding that a treaty that operates itself
without the aid of legislation is equal to an act of the legislature).
77. See id. at 315 (relying on the treaty’s requirement that the land grants be
“ratified and confirmed” to determine that some entity, specifically Congress, was
being directed to act).
78. See Vasquez, supra note 73, at 165 (noting that the distinction “confounded”
lower courts and even confused Justice Marshall, the author of the majority opinion
in Foster, when he revisited it in a later case).
79. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
80. See id. at 89 (discussing the Foster Court’s review of the Adams-Onís Treaty).
81. See id. at 88–89 (holding that the ratification and confirmation enumerated
within the treaty did not require further legislative action).
82. See id. at 89 (acknowledging that the Foster Court did not consider the
Spanish version of the treaty); Vasquez, supra note 73, at 169–70 (arguing that the
newly introduced Spanish version of the treaty “gave the Court some cover to
reverse” the basis of the Foster holding and to determine that the treaty term was
ambiguous).
83. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 89.
84. Id.; see also Vasquez, supra note 73, at 171 (finding that the Percheman Court
ruled that there must be an affirmative statement requiring an additional step for a
treaty to be deemed non-self-executing).
85. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 (1988)
(“Very few courts, however, paid attention to Marshall’s invented distinction between
self- and non-self-operative treaties until the end of the 19th century.”); Vasquez,
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Court sought to clarify the difference between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties by defining those terms. According to the
Medellín Court, self-executing treaties become the law of the land as
86
soon as they are ratified and are thus immediately enforceable.
In contrast, non-self-executing treaties require legislative
implementation before they can be judicially enforceable within the
87
United States.
The true impact of Medellín with regard to treaty interpretation is
subject to substantial debate, and the questions surrounding
self-execution and non-self-execution are far from resolved. It is clear
that Medellín advanced a narrow text-centered approach to treaty
88
interpretation and rejected the presumption of self-execution
89
promoted by a number of legal scholars. Some commentators argue
that Medellín offered new guideposts for judicial treaty
90
interpretation. Others argue that the implications of the Medellín
holding were limited to the facts and did not substantially change the
91
way that treaties are interpreted.

supra note 75, at 704 (claiming that courts and commentators disagree over
questions of how to determine the intent of parties).
86. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 n.2 (2008) (defining a selfexecuting treaty as one that “has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon
ratification”).
87. See id. (stating that a non-self-executing treaty is one that “does not by itself
give rise to domestically enforceable federal law”).
88. See id. at 1358 (declaring that the text of the treaty is the starting point for
any treaty interpretation).
89. See id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the decision established
no presumption favoring self-execution or non-self-execution). The Restatement
explicitly identified a presumption of self-execution and legal scholars argued that,
based on the Supremacy Clause and the Percheman holding, international treaties
were presumptively self-executing unless the text of the treaty required an additional
affirmative act. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 reporter’s note 5 (1986) (“[I]f the Executive Branch has not requested
implementing legislation and Congress has not enacted such legislation, there is a
strong presumption that the treaty has been considered self-executing by the
political branches.”); see, e.g., Vasquez, supra note 73, at 171 (identifying the
“constitutional default rule” as the finding that treaties are self-executing).
90. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Medellín’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation,
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 530 (2008) (arguing that the Medellín decision reshaped the
“legitimate sources that judges may use in treaty interpretation, the degree of their
deference to U.S. executive branch positions, and the general canons (or default
rules) to be followed when construing treaties”).
91. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellín Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 617,
624, 630 (2008) (arguing that the holding in Medellín does not change the consular
notification process promoted by the VCCR and describing international law as an
“interactive process”).
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D. Legislative Standing Hinges on the Ability of a Legislator to Prove an
Injury Sufficient to Satisfy Standing Requirements While Staying Clear of
Separation of Powers Concerns
As discussed in detail in Part III, Medellín raises concerns of an
92
overextension of executive power. One of the limited avenues for
the legislature to challenge such an extension of executive power is
93
through the legal system. However, in order to succeed in court,
legislators must satisfy multiple tests before getting to the merits of
94
the issue, including: meeting the traditional standing requirements,
95
clearing the increased burden of legislative standing, and avoiding
96
the complications surrounding the political question doctrine.
Standing is one of the four main criteria that must be satisfied for a
97
claim to be justiciable in federal court. If a claim is not justiciable,
the court will reject the case without even considering the merits of

92. See infra Part III (discussing how Medellín allows an executive broader leeway
in determining whether to enforce a treaty domestically by creating a presumption of
non-self-execution).
93. While courts are generally hesitant to intervene in a dispute between
Congress and the executive until it is absolutely necessary, the judiciary has stepped
in at times. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 82 (D.D.C. 1998) (barring certain census survey techniques on the
grounds that they were inconsistent with congressional power).
94. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
95. Compare Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 446 (1939) (granting state
legislators standing where executive action undermined the effectiveness of their
vote), with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (rejecting a claim of
legislative standing on the grounds that the legislators did not suffer a sufficient
injury).
96. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (recognizing that certain issues
could render a claim nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine).
97. See Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrointe, Congress Goes to Court:
The Past, Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 214
(2001) (addressing threshold requirements for access to the judicial system).
The other three criteria are mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine.
Id. The doctrine of mootness establishes that a case will not be heard if the “issues
presented are no longer ‘live’” or the parties lack an interest in the outcome. Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). A case is ripe when the issues in the case
are fit for judicial consideration, and there would be hardship against a party if the
court did not hear the case. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300–01 (1998).
This concept carried over to disputes between the legislative and executive branches
because there must be a true impasse between the two bodies for the dispute to be
justiciable. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
The political question doctrine bars a claim if the issue is better suited for the
executive or legislative branches of government. See infra notes 171–182 and
accompanying text (discussing the political question doctrine and enumerating the
standards from the Baker test).
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98

the claim. Standing addresses the question of whether a party is
entitled to have a court decide the question that the party is bringing
99
before that court. Standing’s role as judicial gatekeeper means that
100
it is an important legal concept, but despite its importance—or
maybe because of it—standing has not been strictly defined or
101
limited by the Court.
Instead, the Court has identified specific
principles that it relies upon in determining standing, including:
maintaining the appropriate balance of power between the judiciary
and other branches of government, preserving judicial efficiency, and
102
addressing only specific legal questions.
There are two different types of standing: Article III standing and
prudential standing.
Article III standing is based on the
constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts to
103
104
“cases and controversies.”
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the
Rehnquist Court established three elements required for Article III
105
106
107
standing: an injury, causation, and redressability.
The Supreme Court has primarily focused on the requirement that
there be an actual injury when considering an Article III standing
108
issue. Lujan established that an injury sufficient for standing is one
that is “concrete and particularized,” as well as “actual or imminent,”
98. See Arend & Lotrointe, supra note 97, at 214–15 (stating that a claim does not
satisfy the Constitution’s case or controversy requirement if it does not meet the four
justiciability standards).
99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 60.
100. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (arguing that standing
“is perhaps the most important” of the doctrines that fundamentally limit judicial
power).
101. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (stating that standing has not been consistently
defined in past decisions, and there is no simple way to define the term).
102. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 61 (discussing the Court’s modern position
on standing and the factors it considers when addressing challenges to standing).
103. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Arend & Lotrointe, supra note 97, at 214 (noting
that this phrase is “an indispensible restriction of the jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary”).
104. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
105. See id. at 560 n.1 (establishing that the injury “must affect the plaintiff in a
personal and individual way”).
106. See id. at 560 (defining causation as a “causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of”).
107. See id. at 561 (requiring that there be some likelihood of the possibility of
redress for the complaining party).
108. See Arend & Lotrointe, supra note 97, at 216 (“While the second and third
criteria are self-explanatory, the Supreme Court has spent a great deal of time
elaborating on the first criterion: the requirement of injury.”); see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 57, at 62–63 (considering the elements of causation and redressability as a
single entity addressed by the courts).
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109

rather than “conjectural or hypothetical.” However, that definition
has not resolved questions surrounding the plaintiff’s relationship to
110
the injury and the scope of the injury itself.
In addressing the
personal nature of the injury, the Court has held that the plaintiff
111
must show that he was adversely affected by the alleged action.
In considering what injuries are sufficient for standing, the Court
established that the common law, the Constitution, and statutes all
112
establish interests sufficient for a claim to proceed. The Court has
not spoken definitively as to what other injuries are sufficient to
113
establish standing.
There is limited jurisprudence on the requirements for satisfying
the causation and redressability elements of standing. In earlier
114
decisions, the Court treated the two elements as part of one test.
However, the Court has since clarified its position and indicated that
115
the two elements must be considered independently.
Along with Article III standing, the doctrine of prudential standing
incorporates three additional factors that courts consider when
116
determining whether a party can bring a suit.
Specifically, the
Court has recognized a general limitation on third-party standing, a
prohibition against generalized grievances, and a requirement that
117
the plaintiff be within the zone of interests protected by a statute.
These factors are self-imposed by the courts and can be overcome by

109. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The Court stated that an appropriate injury would
require that the plaintiff show that a “legally protected interest” was at issue. Id.
110. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 64 (“Two questions arise in implementing
the injury requirement: What does it mean to say that a plaintiff must personally
suffer an injury; and what types of injuries are sufficient for standing?”).
111. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (rejecting the plaintiff’s
claim on the grounds that an interest in the alleged problem was not sufficient to
establish standing).
112. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 70–74 (discussing injuries sufficient to
satisfy constitutional standing requirements, including injuries to common law,
constitutional, and statutory rights, as well as other types of injuries, such as
environmental harm or a shift in market conditions).
113. See id. at 73 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent does not develop a
standard principle for determining which interests are sufficient to establish an
injury).
114. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (holding that a plaintiff
must establish causation or redressability to satisfy standing requirements).
115. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984) (arguing that inquiry into
causation must be kept separate from the inquiry into redressability).
116. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 63 (discussing the distinction between
prudential standing and constitutionally required standing).
117. See generally id. at 82–101 (detailing the general categories of, and limitations
on, prudential standing).
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118

legislation. Consistent with the doctrine of prudential standing,
one of the powers Congress has is the ability to determine and
119
express exactly whose interests are protected by a specific statute.
120
In the 2007 Massachusetts v. EPA decision, the Court indicated that
where Congress creates a procedural right for a party to protect
121
concrete interests, certain standing requirements are relaxed.
Specifically, the Court suggested that Congress can statutorily
establish injuries that are sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
122
standing requirements.
The Court also recognized that states are
unique and merit different considerations than private entities when
123
addressing standing questions.
The implications of the doctrine of prudential standing have not
been fully established. Some legal scholars take the view that
prudential standing gives legislators the power to control the scope of
124
the cases the courts consider.
Other commentators argue that
since a plaintiff must satisfy the Article III standing requirements
regardless of whether a prudential standing requirement is
applicable, Congress’s power to control access to the courts is
125
limited.
118. See Ryan McManus, Note, Sitting in Congress and Standing in Court:
How Presidential Signing Statements Open the Door to Legislator Lawsuits, 48 B.C. L. REV.
739, 743 (2007) (stating that at least some of the prudential requirements, including
the bar against a third party claim and the requirement that the claim be within the
plaintiff’s “zone of interest,” are independent from the courts’ Article III powers, and
thus can be overcome by statutory changes).
119. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1970)
(indicating that under its authority to regulate prudential standing through
legislation, Congress was enlarging the class of parties who could challenge
administrative action).
120. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
121. See id. at 517–18 (finding that where Congress creates a procedural right, one
“can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy”).
122. See id. at 516 (arguing that Congress has the authority to define injuries and
establish causation).
123. See id. at 518 (providing that the limited sovereignty of states entitles them to
unique standing considerations).
124. See, e.g., James Dumont, Beyond Standing: Proposals for Congressional Response to
Supreme Court “Standing” Decisions, 13 VT. L. REV. 675, 678 (1989) (arguing that under
Article III, Congress has the power to expand the scope of judicial power to review a
broader variety of cases and controversies). But see Roberts, supra note 57, at 1226
(stating that Article III limits congressional power such that Congress cannot expand
the scope of the case or controversy requirement).
125. See, e.g., Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judicial Discretion: Standing at the
Forefront of Judicial Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1548, 1562–63 (1993)
(acknowledging that Congress can establish a legally created injury but it must still
satisfy the requirements of Article III standing).
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Standing has an important role in maintaining the separation of
powers between the branches of American government. In the 1984
126
Allen v. Wright decision, the Rehnquist Court explicitly stated that
separation of powers considerations were integral in reviewing the
127
Justice Scalia has argued that the
causation element of standing.
principle of standing clearly affects the separation of powers because
128
it can be applied to exclude an entire issue from adjudication.
Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy hinges on applying
standing as a tool to limit the judiciary’s interference with the other
129
branches of government.
Recently, the Roberts Court has made
standing an important factor in a number of cases, indicating that for
a claim to be successful, it must clearly satisfy all standing
130
requirements.
Theoretically, standing for legislators claiming an institutional
injury is no different than traditional standing. In order for
legislators to bring a claim in court, the claim must satisfy the Article
131
III and prudential standing criteria stated above.
In the relatively
small number of cases addressing the issue, however, the courts have
132
set a higher bar for legislators seeking access to the judicial system.
The Supreme Court first considered legislative standing to redress
133
institutional injuries in 1939 in Coleman v. Miller.
In Coleman,
twenty-one Kansas state senators as well as a number of members of
126. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
127. See id. at 761 (relying on the principle of separation of powers to reject a
claim that an administrative agency’s policies failed to fulfill specific obligations).
128. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 892 (1983) (“[I]f all persons who
could conceivably raise a particular issue are excluded, the issue is excluded as
well.”).
129. See Roberts, supra note 57, at 1220 (arguing that standing is vital to preserving
the limited role of the courts); see also Jess Bravin, Barring the Door: Court Under Roberts
Limits Judicial Power, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2007, at A1 (asserting that Roberts’s theory of
“judicial self-restraint” was based on limiting access to the courts).
130. See Krista L. Dewitt, Note, The Revival of Standing as a Limitation to Litigation:
Will Standing Cause More Cases to Fall?, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 601, 602 (2008)
(arguing that the Roberts Court has “refueled” the debate on whether a party
satisfies the standing requirements).
131. See generally supra notes 104–125 and accompanying text (addressing both
Article III and prudential standing requirements).
132. See generally infra notes 133–170 and accompanying text (discussing the
leading cases in the field of legislative standing).
133. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). This remains the only case where the Supreme Court
has recognized legislative standing for institutional injuries. See, e.g., David J. Weiner,
Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205, 214 (2001) (describing
Coleman as “the one previous instance in which the Supreme Court recognized an
institutional injury as a predicate for a legislative suit”).
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the state House of Representatives sued the Secretary of the Senate to
block the endorsement of the Child Labor Amendment to the United
134
States Constitution.
The respondent challenged the legislators’
standing to bring such a claim on the grounds that the legislators did
135
not have an adequate interest in the dispute. The Court held that
because the legislators’ votes should have defeated the measure, the
legislators had a “plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining
136
the effectiveness of their votes.”
The Supreme Court recognized
that where a legislator’s vote was negated by outside action, the
legislator could assert an injury sufficient for standing; thus, the
nullification of the Kansas legislators’ votes was an injury sufficient to
137
establish standing.
Following Coleman, the D.C. Circuit took the lead in addressing
legislative standing, with the criteria evolving over three different
138
tests.
First, the D.C. Circuit determined that where judicial
interpretation of executive action would “bear upon” the duties of
139
the legislature, legislators had standing to sue. One year later, the
D.C. Circuit rejected the “bears upon” test and instead relied on vote
140
nullification as the basis for legislative standing. In a later case, the
D.C. Circuit expressly limited vote nullification as the basis for
legislative standing to situations where the legislative process could
141
not remedy the injury.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit established the
two-part equitable discretion test, under which a legislator had to
134. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436 (challenging the Lieutenant Governor’s right to
cast the deciding vote and arguing that the proposed Amendment “had lost its
vitality” as a result of the Amendment’s rejection by twenty-six states and its failure to
become ratified within a reasonable period of time).
135. Id. at 438.
136. See id. (stating that the legislators’ claims fell squarely within the statute
providing for the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and that they could
properly seek redress in the Supreme Court).
137. See id. (finding that if standing were denied the legislators’ votes would be
“virtually held for naught” regardless of the fact that if their contentions were correct
their votes would be sufficient to change the outcome of the resolution).
138. See McManus, supra note 118, at 749 (discussing the evolution of the D.C.
Circuit’s approach to legislative standing).
139. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (granting members
of the House of Representatives standing to sue members of the executive branch to
block those executive branch members from engaging in acts of war without
congressional approval).
140. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that
“an individual legislator has standing to protect the effectiveness of his vote”).
141. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702–03 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (allowing
standing where senators had no opportunity to challenge the executive’s termination
of a treaty through the legislative process), rev’d on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)
(dismissing the complaint as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine).
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prove the traditional elements of standing as well as show that there
were no other means to seek redress and that no other citizen could
142
bring the claim.
Fifty-eight years after Coleman, the Supreme Court considered
143
legislative standing once again, hearing Raines v. Byrd, a case
144
specifically addressing the issue of vote nullification. Four senators
and two representatives who had voted against the Line Item Veto Act
145
in their respective chambers challenged the Act as unconstitutional.
The Act had passed in the Senate by a vote of 69-31 and in the House
146
of Representatives by a vote of 232-177. The Court held that, for a
number of reasons, the congressmen lacked standing to bring the
147
suit because there was not a sufficient injury to their interests.
However, the majority concluded by noting that both chambers as a
whole opposed the challenge brought by a subset of legislators in this
case, that other parties may have standing to challenge the Line Item
Veto Act, and that Congress could take future steps to repeal the
148
legislation.
In light of Raines, the D.C. Circuit has addressed legislative
149
150
standing twice, in Chenowith v. Clinton and Campbell v. Clinton.
In the 1999 Chenowith decision, legislators challenged President
Clinton’s implementation of the American Heritage Rivers Initiative
on the grounds that the implementation denied them their
constitutionally guaranteed right and responsibility to debate and
151
vote on the various political issues stemming from the initiative.
142. See Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 882 (1981) (relying on a
fair application of the standing principles and a goal of not interfering with the
legislative process as the basis of a two-part analysis of legislative standing cases).
143. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
144. See id. at 824–26 (discussing the vote nullification theory and distinguishing
Coleman by emphasizing the “vast difference between the level of vote nullification at
issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional legislative power” alleged
here).
145. See id. at 816 (challenging the Act as a violation of the bicameralism and
presentment clauses of Article I).
146. Id. at 814.
147. See id. at 829 (distinguishing this case from Coleman because the injury
asserted here was “wholly abstract and widely dispersed”).
148. See id. (regarding as important the fact that the legislator-plaintiffs were not
“authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action”).
149. 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
150. 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
151. See Chenowith, 181 F.3d at 113 (explaining that President Clinton formally
established the initiative by executive order and listing the various political issues
arising from it, such as concerns involving interstate commerce, federal lands, the
expenditure of federal monies, and implementation of environmental policies).
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Despite that problem, the court rejected the legislators’ claim for
152
standing based on the Raines standards.
The court recognized, however, that there may still be an avenue
153
for legislative standing based on the theory of vote nullification.
Specifically, the court determined that an earlier decision, Kennedy v.
154
Sampson, granting legislative standing to a senator who challenged
the President’s pocket veto of legislation that both Houses of
155
Congress had passed may still be good law after Raines. Addressing
Kennedy, the court reasoned that a president’s action that prevents a
bill from becoming law could constitute vote nullification sufficient
156
to satisfy the Raines requirements.
The D.C. Circuit took a much more in-depth look at the legislative
standing issue in Campbell. That 2000 decision arose from a challenge
to President Clinton’s authorization of the U.S.’s participation in
157
international airstrikes against Yugoslavia.
The legislators argued
that the President’s actions were illegal both constitutionally and
158
The court posited that the Supreme Court failed to
statutorily.
159
adequately define vote nullification in Campbell and Raines. Despite
the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the
160
Judge Silberman,
legislators’ claim based on lack of standing.
writing for the majority, relied heavily on the Raines decision to
determine that where congressmen have a legislative remedy for an
161
alleged injury, they will not have standing to assert a claim in court.
152. See id. at 115 (stating that the legislators’ claim for standing was
indistinguishable from the injury asserted in Raines and thus was too “widely
dispersed” and “abstract” to survive).
153. See id. at 116–17 (suggesting that Raines may not undermine some of the
Court’s earlier decisions on legislative standing based on vote nullification).
154. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
155. See Chenowith, 181 F.3d at 116 (“Even under this narrow interpretation
[of vote nullification by the Raines Court], one could argue that the plaintiff in
Kennedy had standing.”).
156. See id. at 117 (asserting that a pocket veto could create a plausible argument
that executive action completely nullified legislators’ votes).
157. See 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that the NATO airstrikes against
Yugoslavia were in response to Yugoslavia’s occupation of Kosovo).
158. See id. (alleging that “the President’s use of American forces against
Yugoslavia was unlawful under both the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and
the War Powers Resolution”).
159. See id. at 22 (“It is, to be sure, not readily apparent what the Supreme Court
meant by [the word ‘nullified’].”).
160. See id. at 23–24 (stating that the legislators may not use the federal courts to
challenge the President’s war-making powers).
161. See id. at 23 (finding that legislators could not assert a vote nullification claim
because they had the legislative power to defeat President Clinton’s order through a
number of possible avenues, including passing a law forbidding the use of U.S. forces
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Judge Randolph, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the
legislators’ claim would fail the Raines analysis but under different
162
reasoning than Judge Silberman. Instead, Judge Randolph argued
that since the executive did nothing to implement the legislative
163
actions Congress had defeated, there was no vote nullification.
Specifically, President Clinton took no military action that would
require congressional approval under the Constitution; thus, he
could not have nullified the legislators’ successful votes against the
164
declaration of war.
Also, by refusing to adhere to Congress’s
rejection of an authorizing resolution, President Clinton was not
165
Instead,
nullifying the legislators’ votes on that resolution.
according to Judge Randolph, President Clinton was not ignoring the
legislators’ vote; he was simply disregarding the War Powers
Resolution itself and the votes of the earlier Congress that had
166
enacted it.
Thus, Judge Randolph concluded that a complaint of
that nature from the legislators was not a valid reason for granting
167
legislative standing based on vote nullification.
Other lower courts have struggled to establish a clear standard for
what injuries are sufficient to make out a successful vote nullification
claim following Raines, which has led to a variety of holdings in
different circuits. For example, the Sixth Circuit has taken a literal

in the campaign, exercising the appropriations power to cut off funding, or
ultimately, through impeachment).
162. See id. at 28, 32 (Randolph, J., concurring) (reasoning that because Congress
will always have the ability to take responsive legislative action in the future, an
argument that rejects legislative standing based on the legislators’ ability to take
future legislative action will effectively do away with the legislative standing doctrine,
a result that was not clearly intended by the Supreme Court in Raines).
163. See id. at 31 (rejecting the legislative standing claim because “in terms of
Raines[,] . . . plaintiffs had the votes ‘sufficient to defeat’ ‘a specific legislative action’
. . . but it is not true . . . that this ‘legislative action’ nevertheless went ‘into effect’”).
164. See id. (stating that “[t]he President has nothing to veto” and that “[he] may
have acted as if he had Congress’s approval, or he may have acted as if he did not
need it”).
165. See id. (explaining the automatic operation of the War Powers Resolution:
unless both chambers act to approve the military action, the troops must withdraw
after sixty days). The War Powers Resolution requires the President to withdraw
troops within sixty days of the commencement of military action unless a majority of
both chambers declares war or approves a continuation of the military action.
50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2006).
166. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 31 (Randolph, J., concurring) (“[The legislators’]
real complaint . . . is that [the President] ignored the War Powers Resolution . . . .”).
167. See id. (recognizing that separation of powers concerns arise by allowing
legislative standing on the basis asserted by the plaintiff-legislators).
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168

approach to vote nullification.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has
granted standing based on vote nullification to a party that did not
169
have a vote in the legislature.
Any claim of legislative standing faces an added hurdle because the
plaintiff-legislator must also overcome the barriers imposed by the
political question doctrine.
While the Raines Court did not
specifically discuss the political question doctrine, part of the reason
the Court rejected standing for the legislators was because of the
170
political nature of their claim.
The political question doctrine arose out of Justice Marshall’s
171
The doctrine bars courts from
opinion in Marbury v. Madison.
encroaching on an unresolved political dispute within the other
branches of government by requiring that courts address an actual
172
legal issue.
The impetus for the doctrine was to provide an

168. See Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2001) (adopting Coleman’s
proposition that for legislators to have standing, they must possess enough votes to
have reversed the actual outcome of the legislation at issue).
169. See Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d 539, 545–46 (9th Cir. 2002) (extending
legislative standing to the Governor of Guam based on vote nullification by the
Guam Supreme Court because, under the operation of a Guam statute, the
Governor’s inaction (i.e., neither signing nor vetoing the bill) should have allowed
the bill to pass, but a Guam Supreme Court ruling inverted the statute and required
the Governor to take action or otherwise the legislation would be vetoed by his
inaction).
170. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997) (describing the legislators’ claim
as a loss of legislative power instead of another more concrete injury).
171. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803) (stating that
certain political powers granted to the executive are “only politically examinable”).
172. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (discussing the original factors
that would render an issue nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine,
including a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a political
department, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
the issue, the impossibility of deciding the issue without a policy determination, the
inability of a court to decide the issue without eroding the respect due the other
branches of government, an unusual need for adherence to a political decision
already made, and the potential for embarrassment as a result of differing
conclusions by each department). Some scholars have argued that there is no such
doctrine and that courts are simply abiding by the constitutional delegation and
separation of powers doctrines. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question”
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 601 (1976) (“The cases which are supposed to have
established the political question doctrine required no such extra-ordinary
abstention from judicial review; they called only for the ordinary respect by the
courts for the political domain.”). However, the standards enumerated in Baker are
good law, have been referenced repeatedly, and were found determinative by the
Court as recently as 1993. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226, 238 (1993)
(citing Baker in support of its rejection of a federal judge’s challenge to his
impeachment as a nonjusticiable political question).
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additional tool for preserving the separation of powers and to prevent
173
friction between the branches.
174
The Court in Baker v. Carr enumerated six characteristics relevant
to determining whether an issue was a nonjusticiable political
175
The Court later determined that the Baker Court
question.
probably believed that not all of the factors carry equal weight,
reasoning that the factors at the beginning of the list are probably
176
more important and more certain than those towards the end.
In the end, judges assessing legislative standing must also consider
whether the issue is one better suited for resolution in a political
177
branch of government (i.e., the executive or legislative branch).
The first Baker factor establishes that if the Constitution textually
commits an issue to a political department, the issue is
178
nonjusticiable.
Second, if there are no judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the issue, it cannot be considered
179
by the judiciary.
Third, an issue is a nonjusticiable political
question if rendering a decision requires a policy determination from
180
a political branch. Courts have stated that the final three factors in
the political question doctrine test as laid out in Baker are ambiguous
181
Those three, respectively, render a decision
and unreliable.
nonjusticiable if resolving the issue would lead to undue disrespect to
one of the political branches, require unusual adherence to a prior
political decision, or create embarrassment due to multiple
182
statements on the issue from the different branches.
Aside from suing the executive as individual legislators, Congress
has additional tools through which members can challenge executive
action or inaction. For example, Congress can use legislative tools,
173. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210–11 (calling the doctrine “primarily a function of the
separation of powers” because it requires a reviewing court to examine the
Constitution to determine to which branch of government the matter was assigned).
174. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
175. See id. at 217; see also supra note 172 (listing the six Baker political question
factors).
176. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004) (“These tests are probably
listed in descending order of both importance and certainty.”).
177. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (stating that the “finality [of] the actions of the
political departments” is a dominant consideration when determining whether an
issue is a nonjusticiable political question).
178. Id. at 217.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249–50 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that
the final three Baker elements are relevant in only the most extreme situations).
182. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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such as its appropriations power and investigative power, to punish
183
the executive for failing to enforce duly passed legislation.
Alternatively, Congress can sue as a single entity in its institutional
184
capacity.
Finally, Congress could pass legislation granting itself
standing when the executive interprets legislation differently from
185
how Congress wrote it or intended it.
II. MEDELLÍN GIVES RISE TO A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO THAT COULD
EVENTUALLY LEAD TO AN EFFECTIVE CLAIM FOR LEGISLATIVE STANDING
While there has not yet been a situation that gives rise to a claim
that the executive is exceeding his power by refusing to enforce terms
of a treaty, the possibility is foreseeable in light of the Medellín
holding. For such a situation to arise, three basic conditions would
have to be met. First, there must be some dispute as to whether a
186
treaty term is self-executing. Second, the Senate must assert that it
intended the treaty term to be self-executing when it ratified the
187
Finally, the executive must refuse to enforce the provision
treaty.
188
that the legislative branch claims he must enforce.
A dispute over whether a treaty term is self-executing could arise in
a variety of situations, easily satisfying the first condition. The
Supreme Court raised this question in Medellín when it refused to
189
review whether terms within the VCCR were self-executing. In light
of that position, there is no definitive answer to questions

183. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Congress has formidable weapons at its disposal—the
power of the purse and investigative resources far beyond those available in the
Third Branch.”).
184. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D.D.C. 1998) (challenging in its institutional capacity a
Commerce Department and Census Bureau plan to use statistical sampling in the
2000 census as inconsistent with the Constitution and the Census Act).
185. See, e.g., Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong.
§§ 3, 5 (2006) (proposing the establishment of standing for members of Congress to
challenge the legality of any presidential signing statement, which is a statement the
President drafts about a bill in conjunction with signing the bill into law).
186. See supra Part I.A and Part I.C (discussing self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties generally and as analyzed in Medellín).
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 133–170 (discussing various cases in which legislators based
their argument for standing in federal court on the theory of vote nullification).
189. 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.4 (2008).
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surrounding the domestic impact of the VCCR as a self-executing or
190
non-self-executing treaty.
Further, there is rarely language in a treaty that explicitly indicates
191
that the treaty term is self-executing. For example, in Medellín, the
treaty term in question said nothing as to whether additional
192
legislation was necessary to enact ICJ judgments. As Justice Breyer
noted in his dissent, similar language in other treaties had been
deemed sufficient to establish the self-executing nature of the treaty
193
term. Additionally, in two Supreme Court cases decided a few years
apart, the Court read the same treaty term as non-self-executing in
194
These examples
the first case but as self-executing in the second.
suggest that a dispute over whether a treaty term is self-executing is
quite possible.
To satisfy the second condition, the Senate must intend that the
195
treaty term be self-executing at the time of ratification.
The
190. Even though the Court did not specifically address the issue in Medellín, most
courts and commentators agree that the VCCR is a self-executing treaty. See, e.g.,
Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2007) (“There is no
question that the Vienna Convention is self-executing.”); Jordan J. Paust, Medellín,
Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive Authority, 31 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 301, 306 n.15 (2008) (presenting a variety of sources supporting
the claim that the VCCR is a self-executing treaty). However, some scholars have
identified an ongoing debate over whether the treaty is self-executing or non-selfexecuting. See, e.g., Howard S. Schiffman, The LaGrand Decision: The Evolving Legal
Landscape of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in U.S. Death Penalty Cases,
42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1099, 1130 (2002) (arguing that enacting state and federal
legislation implementing the VCCR requirements would nullify any remaining
argument over whether the VCCR was self-executing or non-self-executing). Finally,
at least one commentator argues that the Medellín decision itself casts a new question
as to whether the VCCR is self-executing. See David S. Corbett, Comment, From
Breard to Medellin II: The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in Perspective,
5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 808, 820 (2008) (stating that the Medellín holding was based on
the Court’s determination that the VCCR is a non-self-executing treaty).
191. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that treaty
provisions the Court had previously ruled self-executing lacked clear language
indicating them as such).
192. See id. at 1358 (majority opinion) (relying on the “undertakes to comply”
language in the treaty to determine that there was a need for implementing
legislation before an ICJ decision could become binding on state courts).
193. See id. at 1383–84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing a commerce and navigation
treaty between the United States and Denmark to illustrate that language that does
not direct the United States to act domestically can still lead to a determination that
a treaty is self-executing).
194. Compare Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2. Pet.) 253, 315 (1829) (determining that
a specific term in the Adams-Onís Treaty required implementing legislation before it
was binding on domestic courts), with United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
51, 88–89 (1833) (finding that the same term in the Adams-Onís Treaty was selfexecuting based on a reading of the Spanish-language version of the treaty).
195. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1349.
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Medellín Court indicated that the intent of the President and Senate
when they implemented the treaty controlled the determination of
196
whether the treaty term was self-executing.
Such intent could be
based on the treaty negotiators’ understanding at the time that the
treaty was signed or the interpretation of the body charged with
197
interpreting the treaty.
Alternatively, legislators could indicate
their intent through a variety of legislative documents arising out of
198
Finally, intent could be derived from the
the ratification process.
way the other signatories to the agreement behave after they sign the
199
treaty.
The third condition, which arises from the Medellín holding,
specifies that the President must refuse to enforce a treaty term that
200
the Senate intended to be self-executing. Based on a presumption
201
of non-self-execution, the executive would be free to assert that the
202
treaty term was not self-executing.
Courts generally defer to the
196. See id. at 1366–67 (relying on various indicia of the intent of the President
and the Senate in determining that the relevant treaty terms were
non-self-executing); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h (1987) (“[T]he intention of the United States
determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United States . . . .”).
197. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1361 n.9 (considering the ICJ’s interpretation and
understanding of the relevant treaty terms in determining whether the terms were
self-executing); see also Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)
(recognizing that the negotiating and drafting history of a treaty are both relevant to
treaty interpretation).
198. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1359–60 (examining testimony from hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the treaty interpretation process).
199. See Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 226 (establishing that the post-ratification
understanding of the signatories to a treaty is an important element in treaty
interpretation); see also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separation Of Powers as a Safeguard
of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1619 (2008) (suggesting that since some
countries require all treaties to be implemented through domestic legislation,
U.S. courts will rarely be able to conclude that a multinational treaty is self-executing
because a determination of self-execution relies on the mutual intent and actions of
all parties to a treaty).
200. Cf. R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Tried to Soften Treaty on Detainees, WASH. POST, Sept. 8,
2009, at A3 (discussing the Bush administration’s three-year effort to modify the
language in a treaty to make the treaty more favorable in light of the U.S. enemy
combatant policy). Although there is no direct example of such executive action,
signing statements offer a strong parallel because it is another example of the
executive acting contrary to legislative intent. See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges
Hundreds of Laws; President Cites Powers of His Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at
A1 (arguing that the reason for President Bush’s use of signing statements was to
undermine legislative intent and to indicate that his interpretation of the legislation
presented to him was different from Congress’s).
201. See infra Part III (discussing the development of a presumption of
non-self-execution).
202. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
34, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928) (per curiam) (asserting
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203

executive when it comes to treaty interpretation. Whether merited
or not, such deference could encourage the executive to act without
204
regard to the Senate’s post-ratification position on the treaty.
There are numerous examples of situations where the executive
refuses to enforce an act duly passed by the legislature and signed by
205
the President. In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration broadly
206
expanded the constitutionally accepted device of impoundment.
Through impoundment, the Nixon administration rejected
congressional add-ons to the executive budget in numerous areas
even though the budget as approved by Congress was the actual
207
The Nixon administration effectively ignored duly
public law.
enacted legislation—the budget—in favor of the President’s own
208
unenacted budget recommendations.
More recently, President
Bush’s use of signing statements could arguably be characterized as
209
an overt extension of executive power despite legislative limitations.
Finally, with the dominant role of administrative agencies, it is not
uncommon to see the executive interpret language in a manner

that the “undertakes to comply” language in the United Nations Charter foresaw the
need for action from the political branches of the government prior to making the
ICJ decision domestically enforceable and thus the relevant treaty terms were not
self-executing).
203. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 cmt. h (1987) (granting the President the authority to make the initial
determination as to whether a term is self-executing after the ratification of a treaty).
204. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 U.S. 1346, 1355 (2008) (referring to President
Bush’s memorandum that completely ignored legislative intent and stated that it was
within the authority of the executive to determine that state courts must give effect to
the ICJ decision regarding Medellín and the fifty-one other foreign nationals
challenging the state judicial action).
205. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral
Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 132 (1999) (arguing that the power of the executive
to operate unilaterally defines the modern presidency).
206. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 204 (4th ed. 1997) (arguing that Nixon’s use of impoundment “set a
precedent in terms of magnitude, severity, and belligerence”).
207. See id. at 204–05 (identifying the administration’s position that legislative
additions to the budget were irresponsible or meritless).
208. See id. at 205 (“What deserved implementation was not a President’s budget
but a public law.”).
209. Compare Savage, supra note 200, at A1 (“President Bush has quietly claimed
the authority to disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office . . . .”),
with Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 312 (2006) (arguing that while quantitatively high,
President Bush’s signing statements were substantively similar to those used by his
predecessors).
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substantially different from the interpretation the legislature
210
intended.
Consider the following hypothetical presenting a situation that
could lead to a basis for a claim of vote nullification. The President
enters into a treaty with another industrialized country, with the
211
United States understanding the treaty terms to be self-executing.
However, there is no direct language in the treaty that explicitly
212
The treaty requires the countries’
makes it self-executing.
administrative agencies to penalize factory owners if carbon emissions
213
exceed a certain level.
The Senate ratifies the treaty with the
214
During the
understanding that the terms are self-executing.
signing president’s term, no factories exceed the mandated limit, and
no regulatory action is necessary. During the subsequent presidency,
factories begin to exceed the limit but the executive branch refuses to
take the action required by the treaty, and the President argues that
he is not obligated to take such action because the treaty is non-self215
executing.
In the above scenario, private citizens would probably not have
standing to sue because they would not satisfy the injury-in-fact
210. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 11 F.
Supp. 2d. 76, 82 (D.D.C. 1998) (challenging the Census Bureau’s interpretation of
the Census Act); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193–94 (1978)
(enjoining a federal entity from completing a dam where the completion of the dam
would likely cause the extinction of an animal protected by the Endangered Species
Act because the executive could only execute the laws as passed by the legislature).
211. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-24, at 18 (2000) [hereinafter MLAT Ratification]
(“For the United States, the Treaty is intended to be self-executing; no new or
additional legislation will be needed to carry out the obligations undertaken.”);
cf. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, U.S.-Cyprus, Dec. 20, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,078
[hereinafter MLAT] (agreeing to provide mutual assistance in the investigation,
prosecution, and prevention of crimes).
212. See, e.g., MLAT, supra note 211 (making no reference to the legal
effectiveness of the treaty in the United States).
213. Cf. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art. 3, May 22,
2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119, 218 (requiring member states to promulgate regulations to
restrict the production of certain industrial chemicals).
214. Cf. MLAT Ratification, supra note 211, at 18 (“For the United States, the
Treaty is intended to be self-executing; no new or additional legislation will be
needed to carry out the obligations undertaken.”).
215. This sort of reversal of position with regard to international obligations when
a new administration takes office is distinctly possible. See, e.g., Margaret Maffai,
Comment, Accountability for Private Military and Security Company Employees that Engage
in Sex Trafficking and Related Abuses While Under Contract with the United States Overseas,
26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1095, 1122–23 (2009) (discussing the Bush administration’s
renunciation of all obligations stemming from the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court in May of 2002 after the Clinton administration had signed the
agreement in December of 2000).
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216

requirement.
It is unlikely that Congress would be able to pass
implementing legislation for the treaty because that would require
the vote of both chambers and the President’s signature, as long as
less than two-thirds of congress approves, after the executive has
already indicated his disapproval of the requirements by refusing to
217
enforce them.
Therefore, the only remaining challenge to the
executive’s unilateral decision that the treaty term was non-selfexecuting would be for members of the Senate who intended the
treaty term to be self-executing when they voted for ratification to sue
alleging vote nullification.
III. MEDELLÍN CREATES A PRESUMPTION OF NON-SELF-EXECUTION
THAT SHIFTS TREATY ENFORCEMENT POWER IN FAVOR OF THE
EXECUTIVE
While the immediate effect of Medellín may have been to dampen
executive power in the instant case, the long-term effect was just the
opposite. By promoting a presumption that treaty terms are non-self218
executing, the Court actually increased executive power.
Such a
presumption gives the executive virtually unchecked power because
as the above hypothetical suggests, the President can rely on that
presumption to unilaterally refuse to enforce treaty terms
219
domestically.
This new executive power is enhanced even further
by the limited ability of legislators to assert claims for institutional
220
injuries in American courts.

216. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (establishing that
to satisfy standing requirements, an injury must be actual or imminent instead of
conjectural or hypothetical); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 541 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that global warming is too generalized of an
injury to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement established in Lujan).
217. See Moe & Howell, supra note 205, at 143–46 (concluding that because
Congress is made up of multiple members representing distinct constituencies, the
President can unilaterally impede legislative efforts to change the status quo through
the use of the veto power).
218. Compare Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 103, 153–54 (2008) (stating that in light of Medellín, U.S. treaties are presumed
to be non-self-executing), with Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1373 (2008)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the Court was making its decision “[a]bsent a
presumption one way or the other”), and Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and
Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 540–41 (2008) (rejecting arguments
that there is a presumption against self-execution and suggesting that there is no
presumption at all).
219. See supra Part II.
220. See supra notes 133–170 and accompanying text (discussing the higher
burden for legislative standing than traditional standing).
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Prior to Medellín, legal scholars generally recognized a presumption
221
In Medellín, the Court clearly rejected
in favor of self-execution.
that view by finding that a treaty term does not constitute domestic
law if it does not either convey an intent that it be self-executing, or
222
unless Congress has enacted implementing legislation.
The Court
went so far as to implicitly disavow the portion of the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States supporting a
223
presumption of self-execution.
The Court went beyond simply rejecting the presumption favoring
self-execution; the Court implicitly promoted a presumption that
treaties are non-self-executing. The first indication that Medellín
creates a presumption of non-self-execution was the Court’s reliance
224
on the 1884 Head Money Cases. Those cases supported the view that
domestic treaty enforcement was reliant on the honor of the
225
governments that were party to the treaty. In the same paragraph
of Medellín, the Court cited a distinction in The Federalist Papers
between laws and treaties, endorsing the view that treaty enforcement
226
is dependent on the good faith of the parties.
A recognition that
domestic treaty enforcement was based on honor, or the good faith
of the parties, instead of the laws of the land in the respective
countries party to a treaty suggests a view that treaties do not
227
inherently make domestic law.
Another indication of the majority’s transition towards a
presumption of non-self-execution was the strong endorsement of a

221. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 reporter’s note 5 (1987) (“[I]f the Executive Branch has not requested
implementing legislation and Congress has not enacted such legislation, there is a
strong presumption that the treaty has been considered self-executing by the
political branches . . . .”).
222. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008). In his concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens argued that there was no presumption favoring self-execution or nonself-execution. Id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring).
223. See Bradley, supra note 218, at 540 (recognizing that by clearly rejecting a
strong presumption for self-execution, the Court rejected the Restatement’s
endorsement of a low threshold for a treaty to be deemed self-executing).
224. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
225. Id. at 598.
226. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357.
227. Many scholars view this approach as inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause,
which places treaties on equal footing with legislation and regards both as the
supreme law of the land. See, e.g., Carlos M. Vasquez, Treaties as Law of the Land:
The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 600
(2008) (arguing that “[t]he concept of a non-self-executing treaty fits uneasily with
the Supremacy Clause”).
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228

text-centered approach to treaty interpretation.
While the Court
acknowledged that it could look at other indicia of intent, such as the
negotiation and drafting history or the understanding of the parties
after the treaty was implemented, it was clear that the text was the
229
principal basis for treaty interpretation.
In considering the
Optional Protocol, the majority adhered to a textualist approach,
disfavoring factors other than the treaty’s text and rejecting the
230
dissent’s multifactor analysis.
The Court’s narrow focus on the
“undertakes to comply” language in the U.N. Charter and its quick
determination that the phrase did not make the treaty obligation selfexecuting suggest that unless the text of a treaty expressly makes a
231
term self-executing, the term will be interpreted otherwise.
However, as is often the case in statutory interpretation, the “plain
meaning” of the Optional Protocol was not as plain as the majority
suggested. In his dissent, Justice Breyer showed that the “undertakes
to comply” language could easily be interpreted to create an
232
obligation that the treaty be executed without enacting legislation.
At the very least, the Optional Protocol could be considered
ambiguous in whether it indicated the drafters’ intent regarding self233
execution.
The majority coming down on the side of non-self-

228. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (“The interpretation of a treaty . . . begins with
its text.”).
229. Id.
230. See id. at 1362 (arguing that the dissent’s approach would lead to “the openended rough-and-tumble of factors” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
231. See id. at 1358 (finding that the phrase was not an acknowledgement of its
legal effect in American courts). The Court suggested that the words “shall” or
“must” might have satisfied the required intent necessary to make the obligation
under the U.N. Charter self-executing. Id.
232. See id. at 1384 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (using a dictionary definition of
“undertake” to show that it could be interpreted to require execution). Justice
Breyer argued that the majority created clear-statement presumptions that many
treaties that had already been deemed self-executing would not satisfy. Id. at 1380.
Breyer recommended a context-specific test to determine whether a treaty provision
is self-executing. Id. at 1382. Along with his dictionary definition of “undertake,”
Breyer’s analysis of the relevant treaties included a consideration of the language in
the Spanish version of the U.N. Charter, which could be translated to say “become
liable to execute.” Id. at 1384 (internal citations omitted).
233. See id. at 1373 (Stevens, J. concurring) (recognizing that the U.N. Charter
“does not contain the kind of unambiguous language foreclosing self-execution that
is found in other treaties”). According to Justice Stevens, language that creates an
obligation to enact legislation would more clearly reflect the drafters’ intent. Id.
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execution in light of the ambiguous language further endorses the
234
view that all treaties are non-self-executing until proven otherwise.
The final sign that the majority favored a presumption of non-selfexecution was the high threshold the Court determined drafters must
235
meet to show that their intent was to create a self-executing treaty.
As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, few, if any, treaty
provisions that the Court had designated as self-executing in earlier
236
decisions would satisfy the majority’s text-centered approach.
The only way Jose Medellín could have satisfied the Court’s test
would have been to identify textual language clearly showing that the
parties to the treaty intended it to be self-executing, thereby
indicating the Court majority’s support for a presumption of non-self237
execution in Medellín.
Commentators have argued that the Court’s decision seemed to
support Congress’s role in determining the enforceability of
238
treaties.
However, the decision only limited the President’s
authority to domestically enforce non-self-executing treaty terms; it
did not limit the President’s role in deciding whether a treaty was self239
executing or not.
In fact, by creating a presumption of non-selfexecution, the Court made it possible for the executive to assert
240
substantial power over the treaty enforcement process.
234. See Dorf, supra note 218, at 154 n.147 (basing the argument that Medellín
creates a presumption of non-self-execution on the fact that implementing language
is absolutely necessary for a treaty to be self-executing).
235. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1381 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (noting that the majority
opinion cites no case that would satisfy the text-centered approach and that the
concurring opinion only supports the argument that few treaties have language
clearly indicating an intent to be self-executing).
236. See id. at 1392–93 (listing cases as examples of the Court deciding that a treaty
term was self-executing).
237. See id. at 1358 (majority opinion) (suggesting that if the “undertakes to
comply” language contained “must” or “shall” the relevant provision of the U.N.
Charter obligation would have been self-executing).
238. See Ilya Shapiro, Medellín v. Texas and the Ultimate Law School Exam, 2008
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 63, 79 (arguing that the Court determined that if a treaty was not
self-executing that “signals that Congress has reserved the decision to craft enabling
legislation”); Michael J. Turner, Comment, Fade to Black: The Formalization of Jackson’s
Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellín, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 668 (2009)
(providing that Medellín relied on the Youngstown scheme to determine that because
the executive and the legislature disagreed on the enforceability of the ICJ decision,
Congress’s position was favored).
239. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 (“The President has an array of political and
diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations, but unilaterally
converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them.”).
240. See supra Part II (providing an example of an executive’s abuse of the
presumption of non-self-execution).
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IV. THE INCREASE IN EXECUTIVE POWER CREATED BY MEDELLÍN
REQUIRES A MEANS—PREFERABLY IN THE FORM OF LEGISLATIVE
STANDING—TO CHECK THE EXECUTIVE
How can Congress check such an assertion of power by the
executive? One possibility is that members of Congress could claim
that such an act constitutes vote nullification because Congress’s vote
to implement a treaty provision is being superseded by the
President’s refusal to enforce that provision. However, the Court’s
limited jurisprudence on the issue, combined with the separation of
powers concerns that the judiciary raises when considering a dispute
between the legislature and the executive, would make such a claim
241
challenging to assert.
Applying the facts from the hypothetical in Part II, if the
executive’s interpretation of a treaty term is inconsistent with the
Senate’s action on the treaty, the legislators would have standing to
sue in their institutional capacity. This Part first shows that the
hypothetical senators’ claim could meet the traditional standing
requirements that all plaintiffs must satisfy when they bring a claim.
Next, Section B addresses legislative standing and proves that the
senators have suffered the concrete injury of vote nullification.
Having survived the threshold standing questions, Section C posits
that the senators’ claim can survive consideration under the political
question doctrine. Finally, this Part considers the alternate courses of
action available to legislators if they are denied access to the courts.
A. Legislators Challenging Executive Action Following Medellín Can
Satisfy the Traditional Elements of Both Article III and Prudential Standing
Prior to a court’s consideration of the merits of the issue presented
in the hypothetical, the legislator-plaintiffs would have to satisfy
standing requirements. As discussed above, legislators would have to
prove that there was an actual injury caused by the opposing party
242
that a judicial decision could remedy.
Legislators would satisfy the general injury requirements set forth
by traditional standing jurisprudence. Lujan requires a plaintiff to
243
claim that a legally protected interest is at issue.
Based on the
241. See supra Part I.D.
242. See supra notes 108–115 and accompanying text.
243. See id. Most legally protected interests fall into one of three categories: an
injury to common law rights, an injury to constitutional rights, or an injury to
statutory rights. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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hypothetical, the injury to the legislators should satisfy those
244
requirements because it is an injury to a constitutional right.
Specifically, the Constitution guarantees the Senate’s role in
providing advice on and consenting to the implementation of a
245
treaty.
By ignoring the Senate’s intent in his enforcement of the
treaty, the executive in the hypothetical is violating the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the Senate to consent to the
United States’s participation in a treaty.
Within basic standing jurisprudence, showing that there is some
possible injury is only the first step in satisfying the injury
requirement. The plaintiff must also assert an injury that is concrete
246
and particularized, as well as actual or imminent, to gain standing.
The executive’s refusal to enforce the treaty term in the hypothetical
is a concrete and particularized injury because the executive’s action
harms the legislators individually by undermining their constitutional
247
authority.
In the hypothetical, the injury satisfies the actual or
imminent requirement because the executive has already refused to
248
enforce the treaty term.
As discussed below—in Section B of this Part—the hypothetical
raises unique injury issues because the plaintiffs would be bringing
the claim as legislators injured in their institutional capacity.
However, the legislators would be able to satisfy the injury element of
a traditional standing consideration.
Causation is the second element of an Article III standing test.
To satisfy causation, the plaintiff must show that there was a causal
249
relationship between the act complained of and the injury.
The hypothetical legislators could prove causation because the injury
244. Cf. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473 (1987) (acknowledging a sufficient
injury where the appellee claimed that the use of the term “political propaganda”
abridged his First Amendment right to free speech). The injury was sufficient
because the appellee claimed that the use of the term threatened to “cause him
cognizable injury.” Id. Specifically, the application of the term would harm his
reputation and damage his opportunity to get re-elected to political office. Id.
245. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
246. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
247. Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (holding that for an injury to
satisfy standing requirements, the plaintiff must allege specific facts “demonstrating
that the challenged practices harm him”).
The Lujan Court defined the
“particularized” element as requiring the injury to individually and personally affect
the plaintiff. 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.
248. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (indicating that a
plaintiff must show that the injury has occurred or that he is in immediate danger of
sustaining the injury).
249. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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complained of—vote nullification—resulted from decisions and
actions of the executive, the opposing party in any action resulting
250
from the hypothetical.
The final element of the Article III standing requirements is
redressability. Specifically, a positive decision from the court must be
251
likely to ameliorate the plaintiff’s alleged injury.
In the
hypothetical, the positive outcome would be a holding that the treaty
was self-executing and that the executive must therefore enforce its
252
terms—specifically through an injunction ordering performance.
That outcome would satisfy the redressability requirement because it
253
The principal
would redress the alleged injury, vote nullification.
concern leading to the redressability requirement is the judiciary’s
254
aim of avoiding advisory opinions.
Considering a dispute over
treaty interpretation is not an advisory opinion; it instead resolves an
255
actual dispute in favor of one branch.
No prudential standing concerns arise from the senators’ suit in
the hypothetical. The limit on third-party standing is not a problem
because the senators are asserting their own rights or interests,
256
instead of relying on the rights of others.
The senators are not
raising a generalized grievance because the injury is specific to them,
and not something related to their status as citizens suing the
257
government.
Finally, the zone of interests requirement is not

250. Cf. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 509 (recognizing a lack of causation where the injury
complained of resulted from decisions made by an entity that was not involved in the
case).
251. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (establishing that redress for the complaining party
must be at least likely to satisfy standing requirements).
252. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 142 (1991)
(stating that courts commonly grant specific relief by ordering governmental actors
to comply with a law); cf. Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under
NAFTA, Investment Protection Agreements and at the World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.U.S. L.J. 261, 271 (1997) (“To remedy the consequences of breach of treaty . . .
specific performance is theoretically available under public international law . . . .”).
253. Cf. Sprint Commc’n Co. v. APCC Servs., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2008)
(holding that assignees could satisfy the redressability element of standing even if
they immediately transferred any award they received to the assignor).
254. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 78 (noting the position of defenders of the
redressability requirement).
255. See id. at 54–55 (recognizing that the key elements that make a case
justiciable, instead of an advisory opinion, are a dispute between adverse parties and
the likelihood of some change or effect if the outcome favors the plaintiff).
256. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (stating that a party cannot base
his claim on the legal rights or interests of a third party).
257. See id. (finding that where a harm is equally shared by a large class of citizens,
that harm is generally not sufficient for standing).
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applicable because the senators’ right is a constitutional one, not one
258
established by legislation.
B. Medellín Creates a Situation Where Legislators Can Satisfy the More
Stringent Requirements Necessary to Establish Legislative Standing
While satisfying the standing requirements may appear
straightforward, the courts’ failure to clearly define vote nullification
affects the legislators’ ability to effectively assert that injury in the
hypothetical scenario presented in Part II. The Supreme Court has
recognized that legislators have a legal “interest in maintaining the
259
effectiveness of their vote.”
However, Coleman is the only case
where the Supreme Court has recognized legislative standing as an
260
injury and considered the merits of the case.
The hypothetical presented in Part II provides a situation where
the executive refused to enforce a treaty provision, deeming it nonself-executing when the Senate at the time of ratification intended
261
the provision to be self-executing.
There is an extremely high
threshold that the legislators must overcome to prove that the
effectiveness of their votes has been compromised and that vote
262
nullification is an injury sufficient to satisfy standing requirements.
For example, the senators must show that they had enough votes to
shift the outcome of the vote one way, but the outcome was
263
inconsistent with that vote. This is not to suggest that at least sixtyseven senators who voted to ratify a treaty must be parties to the suit;

258. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 97 (“[T]he zone of interests requirement is
used only in statutory cases, usually involving administrative law issues.”).
259. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939).
260. See supra notes 133–137 and accompanying text (discussing Coleman as the
basis for a claim of legislative standing).
261. See supra Part II (providing a hypothetical that forms the basis of a claim of
vote nullification).
262. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 814, 829 (1997) (denying a claim of
legislative standing where federal legislators argued that the executive’s ability to
cancel spending and tax benefit measures after he had signed them into law
constituted vote nullification).
263. Compare Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436–37 (recognizing vote nullification as an
injury when all twenty state senators who voted against ratification sued, joined by
one other senator and three state house members, and where the vote at issue was a
twenty-twenty tie in the state senate), with Raines, 521 U.S. at 814 (rejecting the claim
of vote nullification where only four senators and two congressmen sued and the
outcome of the vote was determined by a thirty-eight vote margin in the Senate and a
fifty-five vote margin in the House).
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instead any plaintiff must be able to show that he successfully voted
264
for one outcome but the opposite outcome was effectuated.
Like the legislators in Coleman, the senators in the hypothetical
suffered the concrete injury of vote nullification because they have a
“plain, direct, and adequate” interest in maintaining the effectiveness
265
of their vote establishing a treaty provision as self-executing. When
the executive undermined the senators’ interest in protecting the
effectiveness of their votes by refusing to enforce the treaty
obligation, the senators sustained an injury identical to the injury
266
suffered by the legislators in Coleman.
Specifically, in the hypothetical, when the senators voted to ratify
the treaty, they understood that the treaty required the executive
267
branch to take specific action. Their vote to ratify the treaty would
have been, at least in part, contingent upon an expectation that the
268
executive branch would carry out the required action.
The
executive’s refusal to enforce the treaty obligation completely
undermined the purpose and effectiveness of the senators’ vote, thus
placing the senators in a situation similar to the legislators in Coleman
269
and Kennedy.

264. See, e.g., Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 (declining legislators’ analogy between their
case and Coleman because “[t]hey have not alleged that they voted for a specific bill,
that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was nonetheless
deemed defeated”). The Court based the determination that the plaintiff-legislators
were not sufficiently injured to establish standing not on the number of plaintiffs,
but on the fact that they appeared to be attempting to reverse a political loss through
the judicial branch. Id.
265. Cf. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438 (granting standing to senators claiming vote
nullification where executive action completely undermined the effectiveness of
their votes against the ratification of a constitutional amendment).
266. Id.
267. Cf. id. (acknowledging an injury where an insufficient number of senators
voted to ratify a constitutional amendment but the state endorsed ratification despite
that, undermining the legislature’s expectation that the amendment would not be
ratified).
268. The Senate often explicitly states whether or not it intends a treaty to be selfexecuting when it is considering the treaty for ratification, suggesting that it is a
factor in the decision. See, e.g., S. EXEC. REP. NO. 108-8, at 3 (2003) (commenting that
“[n]o separate implementing legislation is necessary for this purpose” with regard to
the Montreal Convention).
269. Compare Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438 (finding vote nullification where half of the
state senate voted against ratifying a constitutional amendment but the amendment
was ratified despite the vote), and Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 442 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (recognizing vote nullification where the both chambers of Congress voted to
pass legislation but it was not implemented by the executive), with Raines, 521 U.S. at
829 (rejecting a claim of vote nullification in a challenge of the executive’s
application of legislation overwhelmingly passed in both chambers), and Campbell v.

770

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:731

The situation facing the hypothetical senators also satisfies the postRaines legislative standing considerations discussed in Chenowith and
Campbell because the executive’s refusal to enforce the treaty
270
obligation completely nullified the senators’ votes.
The senators’
claim would survive for the same reason that the Chenowith court
suggested the Kennedy holding was valid: the executive’s refusal to
recognize properly approved legislative action constitutes complete
271
nullification of the votes to pass that legislation.
In the
hypothetical, the senators voted to require the executive to recognize
the treaty as self-executing, and his refusal is equivalent to the
272
inappropriate pocket veto in Kennedy.
Further, the executive’s refusal to recognize the treaty as selfexecuting is complete nullification based on Justice Randolph’s
273
concurrence in Campbell. In the hypothetical, the senators required
the executive to view the treaty term as self-executing through their
approval of the treaty; the executive’s refusal to effectuate that treaty
274
term means that the senators’ votes were “for naught.”
Applying
the analysis invoked by Judge Randolph: “in the language of Raines,”
the hypothetical senators had sufficient votes to pass the treaty with a
self-executing term, but this legislative action did not go “‘into

Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denying legislative standing where the
executive’s action was only tangentially related to legislative votes).
270. See Chenowith v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing
that an unconstitutional pocket veto of legislation duly passed by Congress could
satisfy the Raines complete nullification requirement); see also Campbell, 203 F.3d at 31
(Randolph, J., concurring) (arguing that if legislation prohibiting executive action
had passed both chambers and the executive had taken the action regardless, the
legislators would have a valid claim of complete nullification).
271. See Chenowith, 181 F.3d at 116–17 (arguing that Kennedy would probably satisfy
the narrow vote nullification requirements implemented by the Court in Raines
because it was sufficiently similar to Coleman).
272. See id. at 117 (finding that the pocket veto in Kennedy constituted complete
nullification because it was the executive’s action that “prevented the bill from
becoming law” instead of a lack of legislative support).
273. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 31 (Randolph, J., concurring) (suggesting that if the
President had declared war despite Congress’s rejection of the declaration of war the
legislators would have standing because the actions they voted to prohibit were
executed anyway, thus nullifying the effectiveness of their votes).
274. Cf. id. (positing that if the President had taken action inconsistent with
Congress’s rejection of the declaration of war, the legislative votes would have been
rendered meaningless).
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275

effect.’” This basis is sufficient to grant the senators standing based
276
on a claim of vote nullification.
Unlike the situation in Raines, recognizing legislative standing is
the last (and only) resort to limiting the assertion of the executive in
277
the hypothetical.
The senators’ standing claim is strengthened by
278
the fact that there is no viable alternate remedy for the legislators.
In the hypothetical, legislative recourse would be unlikely because
implementing legislation would have to pass both chambers and
279
survive executive consideration.
This is an unreasonable
expectation because ratification only requires consideration from the
280
Senate. Further, a court would likely recognize legislative standing
281
because no private party could challenge the executive’s action.
|
It would be extremely difficult for a private individual to prove the
injury, causation, and redressability elements of Article III standing in
282
the hypothetical.
C. Legislators Seeking a Judicial Solution to Executive Action Under
Medellín Can Avoid Raising a Non-Justiciable Political Question
A suit to challenge the executive’s inaction in this situation would
not raise a political question that the courts would be unable or

275. See id. (considering a step-by-step application of the Raines requirements for
vote nullification to the legislators’ claim).
276. Compare Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(determining that the executive’s refusal to implement duly passed legislation was
vote nullification), with Campbell, 203 F.3d at 31 (Randolph, J., concurring) (arguing
that the vote nullification claim was unfounded because the executive action was not
sufficiently related to the legislative action).
277. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (implying that if there was no
other opportunity to challenge the line item veto the outcome of the case might have
been different and that the legislative standing question certainly would have been
considered differently).
278. See id. (suggesting that since members of Congress could repeal the Line
Item Veto Act or remove appropriation bills from the measure’s scope, they have
other opportunities for recourse). But see Campbell, 203 F.3d at 32 (Randolph, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the general ability to vote for or against new legislation in
response to executive action does not negate legislative standing for a claim of vote
nullification).
279. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the hurdles to the
enactment of the Senate’s intent); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing for
the presentment and enactment of legislation and enumerating the veto override
process).
280. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (enumerating the treaty-making process).
281. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–30 (suggesting that when a private party can
challenge the constitutionality of an act, the Court should not unnecessarily
intercede in the dispute between the political branches).
282. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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unwilling to answer. Specifically, the legislators would seek an
283
The overarching
injunctive order compelling executive action.
issue in the suit would be whether the treaty term was self-executing;
essentially it would be the same type of treaty interpretation in which
284
the Court has regularly engaged.
In reviewing whether an issue raises a nonjusticiable political
question, courts generally apply the six-part Baker test. The Supreme
Court has recognized that some of the elements are more important
285
and clearly supported than others.
Applying the Baker test to the
hypothetical scenario above proves that a legislative suit would not
286
raise an issue violating the political question doctrine.
First, the Constitution does not commit resolution of this issue to
one of the political departments. In determining whether the
Constitution textually commits the resolution of the issue to a
political branch, the Court must interpret the constitutional grant of
287
treaty-making powers—specifically the Treaty Clause.
The Treaty
Clause authorizes the executive to make treaties with the advice and
288
consent of the Senate. The Treaty Clause does not mention treaty
289
The only clause that could be read to encompass
interpretation.
290
The Supremacy
treaty interpretation is the Supremacy Clause.
Clause does not expressly state that one branch must enforce or

283. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
284. For example, in Foster v. Neilson, the Court found that specific terms in the
Adams-Onís treaty were not judicially enforceable absent implementing legislation.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). Shortly thereafter, in United States v. Percheman, the
Court overruled Foster and held that the terms in the Adams-Onís treaty addressed in
that case were in fact self-executing based on the Spanish-language version of the
treaty. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88–89 (1833). And recently, in Medellín v. Texas, the
Court interpreted the text of the provisions of the U.N. Charter to determine that
ICJ decisions were not domestically enforceable without implementing legislation.
128 S. Ct. 1346, 1358–60 (2008).
285. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (stating that the political
question tests as listed in Baker “are probably listed in descending order of both
importance and certainty”).
286. See supra notes 172–182 and accompanying text (discussing the political
question doctrine and listing the factors in the Baker test).
287. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969) (establishing that review
of a textual commitment requires an interpretation of relevant constitutional
language). In Powell, the Court rejected the argument that the ability of Congress to
exclude members was a nonjusticiable political issue because the Constitution allows
Congress to judge the qualifications of its own members. Id. at 522.
288. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
289. See id.
290. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (suggesting that treaties carry the same weight as
the Constitution and the laws made pursuant to the Constitution).
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291

interpret the efficacy of treaties. Based on a reading of the Treaty
Clause and the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution does not relegate
the final word in treaty interpretation to a political branch. In fact,
one could argue that the judicial branch is the division of
292
government to which the Constitution has relegated that power.
Second, the judiciary would be perfectly capable of discovering and
managing a standard to resolve the issue raised in the hypothetical.
To satisfy the second Baker requirement, the Court must resolve the
293
issue by setting forth clear rules.
Additionally, at least to some
extent, future courts must be able to effectively rely on the test
294
Because the issue raised in the
enunciated by the Court.
hypothetical is ultimately one of treaty interpretation, courts have
already discovered and established a manageable—if not reliable—
295
standard to resolve the issue.
Third, there is not a policy question at issue in the hypothetical;
instead, the question is simply whether the treaty term is selfexecuting and whether the executive must act in accordance with the
treaty obligation. In attempting to clarify this element of the Baker
test, courts have indicated that where rendering a decision requires
the balancing of a variety of social or political interests, that decision
296
is barred as a nonjusticiable policy determination.
In the
hypothetical, the balancing of political or social interests would not
be necessary because that would have been conducted by the
executive in drafting the treaty and the legislature in consenting to
297
the treaty.
Instead, the court would only have to determine
291. See id.
292. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–54 (2006) (stating that
treaty interpretation “is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department, headed by the one supreme Court”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(“If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each.”).
293. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (arguing that the laws
established by the courts must be “principled, rational, and based upon reasonable
distinctions”).
294. See id. at 281–82 (rejecting an earlier test and finding that gerrymandering
claims are nonjusticiable on political grounds because the earlier test was
unmanageable in that other courts could not rely on the test).
295. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (applying a text-based
treaty interpretation aimed at discovering the intent of the parties to the treaty).
296. See, e.g., Smith v. Babcock, 19 F.3d 257, 266 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he balancing
of the relevant interests is quintessentially a political question most appropriately
resolved by the elected branches of government.”).
297. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that certain foreign policy
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whether the parties to the treaty intended the term to be selfexecuting based on the text of the treaty and the other elements
298
discussed in Medellín.
The final three elements in the Baker test do not merit
independent consideration; they are the least important and least
299
certain aspects of the test. In reviewing an issue for its justiciability
under the political question doctrine, the Court has glossed over
300
these three tests. Further, relying on that position, an issue is likely
301
to fail one of those three tests only in the most extreme situations.
Foreign policy and treaty making are not inherently categorized as
302
In Powell, the Court rejected
one of those extreme situations.
claims of nonjusticiability per the final three tests by citing the
303
judicial branch’s constitutional authority.
Consistent with that
standard, resolving disputes between the legislature and the executive
over the interpretation of a treaty to the detriment of one branch’s
304
position would not fail one of the final three Baker tests.
In Raines, the Court suggested that if there were no alternate
means to address the issue in that case, the outcome might have been

interests may require initial consideration from a political branch and thus could
raise a nonjusticiable political issue for courts).
298. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant aspects of a
treaty for the purposes of interpreting the treaty-makers’ intent).
299. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (discussing the final three Baker tests: the inability of
a court to decide the issue without eroding the respect due the other branches of
government, an unusual need for adherence to a political decision already made,
and the potential for embarrassment as a result of differing conclusions by each
department).
300. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548–49 (1969) (addressing the final
five Baker tests in two cursory paragraphs after addressing the first test for nearly
thirty pages).
301. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The fourth through
sixth Baker factors appear to be relevant only if judicial resolution of a question
would contradict prior decisions taken by a political branch in those limited contexts
where such contradiction would seriously interfere with important governmental
interests.”).
302. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (arguing that the fact that a case
addresses a matter of foreign policy does not automatically make it nonjusticiable).
303. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 549 (“Our system of government requires that federal
courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the
construction given the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such
an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts’ avoiding their constitutional
responsibility.”).
304. Cf. U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d
76, 104 (D.D.C. 1998) (resolving a dispute between the legislature and the executive
regarding the census without causing undue disrespect to a political branch,
breaching an unusual need for adherence to an existing political decision, or
producing multifarious statements on the issue).

2010] THE POST-MEDELLÍN CASE FOR LEGISLATIVE STANDING

775

305

different.
Specifically, the Raines Court indicated that Congress
could legislate its way out of the problem or a private party could sue
306
for the injury.
In the hypothetical scenario, there would be no
sufficient alternative to restore the value of the Senate’s vote to ratify
a self-executing treaty term other than granting legislators standing
307
to sue for vote nullification. The Senate could not simply legislate
around the issue because any bill would need support from the
House and the President; specifically, traditional legislation would
308
have to cross a different threshold than treaty ratification.
Additionally, due to the abstract nature of the injury, no private party
would be able to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III
309
standing based on the facts of the hypothetical.
Courts should recognize legislators’ standing in this situation
because the best way to equalize the balance of power between the
executive and legislative branches in light of the Medellín holding
would be for courts to recognize legislative standing in instances
where Congress challenges the executive’s refusal to enforce a
310
treaty.
It would then be the duty of the judiciary to interpret the
treaty provision or the implementing legislation to determine if the
311
The courts are perfectly
terms of the treaty were self-executing.

305. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (recognizing that Congress
could take legislative steps to remedy the plaintiffs’ complaint or another party could
have a constitutional challenge to the case).
306. Id.
307. See supra notes 216–217 and accompanying text (addressing barriers to
alternative methods of challenging executive action).
308. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring the consent of two-thirds of
the Senate for treaty ratification), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring that
legislation pass both chambers of Congress and be approved by the executive or that
both chambers vote to supersede the executive’s veto by a two-thirds vote).
309. See Roberts, supra note 57, at 1223–24 (arguing that based on Article III
standing limitations, courts should only hear cases as a “last resort” and when a
decision is consistent with separation of powers and appropriate for judicial
consideration); see also Paul Alexander Fortenberry & Daniel Canton Beck,
Chief Justice Roberts—Constitutional Interpretations of Article III and the Commerce Clause:
Will the “Hapless Toad” and “John Q. Public” Have Any Protection in the Roberts Court?,
13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 55, 73 (2005) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts opposes
citizen suits to the extent that they force the courts to take action constitutionally
assigned to the executive). But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–21 (2007)
(recognizing standing for a state’s challenge of the EPA’s failure to enforce the
Clean Air Act while acknowledging that states receive unique standing considerations
in some situations).
310. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that legislators in the hypothetical would satisfy
both traditional and legislative standing requirements).
311. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 953, 957 (1994) (“[O]ur courts have a duty to interpret treaties.”).
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capable of undertaking this level of analysis as evidenced by Medellín
312
and countless other cases in the Supreme Court and lower courts.
D. If Courts Refuse to Recognize Legislative Standing in the Situation
Created By Medellín, Alternate Steps Would Be Available
to the Legislative Branch
If courts do refuse to grant the hypothetical senators’ standing,
there are other, possibly futile, steps that Congress could take in
trying to implement its intent. First, Congress could try to pass
legislation that clarifies the body’s intent with regard to the treaty or
313
the provision.
As traditional legislation, this, of course, would be
subject to presidential veto, and if the executive was acting contrary
to legislative intent, it is unlikely that he would sign legislation forcing
314
him to alter his course of action. Reversing the President’s veto in
this situation would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers, a
315
significant constitutional hurdle.
Alternatively, Congress could use its legislative powers—such as the
budget and appropriations process or its investigative role—as
316
persuasive tools to change the executive’s course of action. Finally,
either chamber of Congress could sue as an entire body challenging
317
Each of the
the President’s enforcement of the treaty provision.
above steps would require a higher level of support than the actual
vote to ratify the treaty, and they do not qualify as suitable alternatives
318
to legislative standing under Raines.
312. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1392–93 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(listing cases where the Supreme Court has determined that a treaty term was selfexecuting); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326(2) (1987) (“Courts . . . have final authority to interpret an international
agreement . . . .”). See generally Bederman, supra note 311, at 955–63 (discussing the
courts’ constitutional obligation to interpret treaties).
313. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (establishing the legislative powers of Congress
and requiring presentment).
314. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the barriers to
enactment against the executive’s will).
315. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (enumerating the veto and veto override
process).
316. See Sanchez-Espinosa v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (identifying legislative powers that serve as a check on
the executive).
317. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 82 (D.D.C. 1998) (acknowledging the House of Representative’s
standing to sue and challenge the Census Bureau’s use of statistical sampling in the
census as inconsistent with the Census Act).
318. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J.,
concurring) (contending that under Raines, just because Congress can vote on the
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The best alternate course of action for Congress would be to
preemptively pass legislation recognizing and defining the injury of
319
vote nullification.
Under some interpretations of the doctrine of
prudential standing, Congress can control the scope of the cases that
320
courts consider by defining the injury and causation elements.
If Congress created a clearly defined injury, the courts may even relax
321
certain elements of Article III standing.
However, some view the
doctrine of prudential standing as an additional limit within Article
III standing and would reject congressional efforts to expand
standing under that doctrine to a claim that did not meet the Article
322
III requirements.
CONCLUSION
Medellín increased executive power to the extent that presidential
action can undermine the votes of members of Congress, thus
establishing legislative standing for those members. The holding
shifted the balance of power towards the executive by creating a
323
presumption that treaties are non-self-executing.
The Roberts
Court developed the presumption by holding that unless the text of a
treaty clearly indicates that self-execution was the intent of the
324
parties, the treaty is non-self-executing.
The shift in power allows

issue in the future does not automatically mean that an earlier vote on the same issue
has not been nullified).
319. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007) (recognizing a lower
threshold to satisfy redressability and immediacy requirements when a party asserts a
procedural right).
320. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (arguing that legislation could
relax the Article III standing elements).
321. See generally John D. Echevarria, Critiquing Laidlaw: Congressional Power to
Confer Standing and the Irrelevance of Mootness Doctrine to Civil Penalties, 11 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 287, 295–301 (2001) (addressing the Court’s modern approach to
recognizing congressionally created rights of action under Article III); Martin
Kellner, Congressional Grants of Standing in Administrative Law and Judicial Review:
Proposing a New Standing Doctrine from a Delegation Perspective, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 315,
328–33 (2007) (discussing Congress’s ability to create a case or controversy by
passing laws creating legal rights).
322. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (suggesting that Article III
standing requirements establish a ceiling for justiciable claims).
323. See supra Part III (discussing the establishment of a presumption of non-selfexecution).
324. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (basing the treaty review
on an analysis of the text and requiring some textual indicia of intent that the treaty
be self-executing).
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the executive to make the final determination of whether a treaty is
325
domestically enforceable.
Members of the legislature have limited opportunities to respond
to an executive who interprets a treaty provision differently than the
Senate intended. If members of the Senate sued to force the
President to execute the treaty obligations consistent with the
Senate’s intent at the time of ratification, those members would have
326
standing.
Senators challenging the executive’s inaction would
satisfy the traditional Article III requirements of standing because
they would be able to assert a concrete injury, show causation, and
327
satisfy redressability standards. The senators’ claim would not raise
any prudential standing concerns because it is not a third party claim,
328
a generalized grievance, or within the purview of a statute.
The senators would also overcome the specific barriers created by
their role as legislators. The senators in the hypothetical would claim
an injury sufficient to overcome the barriers associated with legislative
329
standing.
Specifically, the legislators would be able to effectively
assert a claim of vote nullification because executive inaction would
completely undermine the effectiveness of their votes to ratify the
330
treaty as self-executing. Further, the legislative suit would not raise
331
a nonjusticiable political question.
In the end, courts should recognize legislative standing in the
hypothetical situation. However, if they do not, the legislature has
other options in checking the type of executive action presented in
the hypothetical. For example, both chambers could sue as an entity,
332
vote to withhold funding, or pass implementing legislation.
Alternatively, Congress could attempt to expand the scope of

325. See supra Part II (presenting a hypothetical situation where the executive
refuses to enforce treaty provisions).
326. See supra Part IV.A (applying the hypothetical to the traditional standing test).
327. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (enumerating
the requirements for Article III standing).
328. See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability
of prudential standing).
329. See supra Part IV.B (considering the requirements for legislative standing).
330. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (recognizing that legislators
have an interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes).
331. See supra Part IV.C (addressing the relevance of the political question
doctrine in light of the hypothetical).
332. See supra Part IV.D (considering alternate possibilities for legislators to
respond to an executive’s expansion of power).

2010] THE POST-MEDELLÍN CASE FOR LEGISLATIVE STANDING

779

legislative standing by passing legislation recognizing a cause of
333
action for vote nullification.
If Congress is barred from asserting a vote nullification claim in
light of the Medellín holding, the Court will have significantly
increased executive power. The only way to maintain an appropriate
balance of power in treaty enforcement is either for courts to
recognize vote nullification or for Congress to step forward and
protect its powers in advance.

333. See supra notes 320–322 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of
creating a cause of action through legislation).

